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The Legality and Ethics of
Therapeutic Human C loning

Justin Perry*

An ovemiew ofthe mrrenr legal and ethical ismes surrounding the cloning of
human emb1yos for scimtific research.

I

n the summer of 2003, a group of geneticists in South Korea annou nced
th ey had do ne what many had waited for (with varying degrees o f anticipation and horror) since the birth of Dolly the sheep in 1997: cloned human
embryos in vitro by nuclear substi tution. The reaction to their announcement has been both immediate and incense: supporters herald a new day for
generic, d evelopmental and seem-cell research, calling the Korean work
"staggeringly important,"' while critics see the practice as both immoral and
"oversold," ~ saying the cost- an extensive destruction of human embryos for
the purposes of research- far out\veighs potencial benefits in treating genetic
disease:' In the Un ited Stares, while scientists and politicians d isagree about
therapeutic cloning (cloning for research purposes), almost everyone opposes
human reproductive cloning, the implanrarion of cloned embryos in utero to
p roduce a human child . Reproductive cloning has been called "grossly immoral" and an "affront to human d ignity,''• and many scientists, including
the South Korean researchers, have urged for an international ban or moratorium on its p ractice.' T his article will give an overview of the current legislation regarding therapeutic human cloning in rhe United Scates, compare
its po tential and actual legality to the legal ity of processes sometimes considered commensurate, and finally, in light of these arguments, take an ethical and legal stance on the issue. I will ultimately conclude rhar therapeutic
• Justin Perry is a senior at BYU majoring in philosophy from Orcm, Unth. He plans to
anmd graduate school in wriring or philosophy starting f., I) 2007.
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cloning is roo d ifferen t fro m p rocesses like abortion and IVF ro be considered legally com mensurate with these p ractices. I will also conclu de
that, fro m an et hica l stand point, therapeuric cloning is on m uch more d ub ious ground than abortion, IVF, o r ordinary stem-cell research . Wh ile
ou r reasons for questioning the eth ical perm issibi li ty of therapeutic
cloning are more or less the same as for these other practices, we have
fewer compelling reaso ns for accepting therapeutic cloning despite these
questions.
Because almost everyone is op posed to reproductive cloning-and because there is really no djsagreement regarding irs legaliry- 1 will not discuss
it extensively here.

Process ofTherapeutic Cloning
Therapeutic cloning is the asexual production of hum<ln embryos by
nuclear substirurion" fo r subsequenr harvest and research: Embryos are nor
allowed to grow beyond the blastula phase (about 50- 200 cells)." T he p rimary interest in harvest ing cloned embryos is fo r their stem cells, so-called
"plastic master cells" rhat evenrually become many of rhe bod y's tissues.
Becmase rhey are potentially easier to p roduce and do not involve ferr iliz.arion , researchers could use cloned embryos as a replacement for existing
stem-cell lines, which are now available only from rhe lefrover prod ucts of
in vitro ferti lization. Scientists gen erally agree that the benefits of stern-cell
research are great, bu t many have expressed ethical oppositio n to the means
used in obtaining them .

' Brian Hansen, Clt~ning debtllt', The CQ Researcher Online 2004, ;~vailahlc ar
http://library.ctJpress.com/cqrcst'archcr/nJrCsrrc20041 02200.

: !d.

' /d.
• John Harris. Goodbye Dt~l/y? '/1;e l:.ihirs of Humrm Cuming. 23 Journal of Medical
Erhics, 353 (1997).

' /d
•· That is, by removing the nucleus of an egg cdl, replacing it with dm of a n adulr cdl
and stim ulating the resu lting cell ro divide:.
Brian Hansen, Cloning rlebme, T he CQ Rest-a rcher Online 2004,
Imp://library.cqprcss.com/cqrcscarchcr/cqresrrc2004 I 02200.

• Ht1rris, Coodbye Dofly?ar 353. 354.
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Current Legislation
Currently, there is no legislation ac the fede ral level governing the practice of therapeutic human cloni ng.'' This is true also fo r seem-cell research in
general: though these issues have been horly debated in Washington both
legally and ethically, the only laws and initiatives passed so far have directed
appropriation of fede ral funding for seem-cell research, not the practice itself.
In 2001, what is called the "Bush compro mise'' established the current preceden t fo r federal seem-cell research fund ing."' Although this and similar measures- based, in general, on National Bioethics Advisory Commission
(N BAC) and National Institutes of Health (NIH) guidelines"- have established rhe cu rrent federa l attitude toward embryonic stem-cells and cloning,
these measures are in reality quite benign in deciding their legality. As Angela
Campell says, "Privately funded biotechnology labs remain an unregulated
and un monitored 'free-for-all' setting for the pursuit of stem cell research.''' 2
In light of this lack of federal direction, several states have enacted legislation either permitting or banning therapeutic clon ing. Every law passed
thus fa r has banned reproductive cloning. These laws tend to be simple and
straightforward . They are based principally on a definition, like Connecticut's
"clo ning a human being,"u fo llowed by a simple prohibition based on d1is
d efin ition. The Connecticut law, meant to ban reproductive clon ing and permit therapemic clo ning and stem-cell research on existing lines, defines
clon ing as "inducing or permitting a replicate of a living h uman being's complete set of genetic material to develop in to the stage of human development
after the embryonic stage when cells undergoing division are sufficiently dijfetendated such that organ formation is obsen;able." 14 O ther states base their prohibition on different definitions, thereby allowing or disallowing d ifferent
., Angela Campbell. 1:/hos rmd hi:onomicr: Hwmzining the Rntionnk Underlying Stem Cell
rmd Cloning Research Polit:ies in the United Sttltes, Germnny. ttnd Jnpnn, 31 Am. j. L.
and Med. 47, 47 (2005).
'" !d. at 47.
" Emilie W. C lem mens, Crmring Human l:rnb,yos for Reserm-h: A Sciellfi.<ts Per.rpecrive on
JV!nnaginf{ the /.ega! and EthiCII! Issues, 2 Ind. Health L. Rev. 95, 95 (2005).
" C:amphdl ar 47.
" National conference of Stare l.cgislarurcs, State Humnn Cloning Lt~ws,
h np:// www. ncsl.o rg/ programs/l1<:al rh/generics/ rt -shcl. h rm.

,, !d.
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practices. T he key here, as we shall see, is a manipulation of the (exceptionally unclear) definition of "human life" or "human being." These srare laws
demonstrate the tremendous power such a definicion has over our legal and
ethical chinking.
Therapeutic Cloning's Legal Similarity to Other Processes
Thus Far therapeuric cloning legislation has been fragmenred and cursory: many stare laws seem simply to reflect in itial trepidation in the face of
a novel challenge. Can a better way be found through jurisprudence?
Cenainly therapeuric cloning shares some characteristics with in-vitro fertilization (IYF) and abortion; to what extent does the legal reasoning employed
in these instances, then, correspond to the cloning of human beings? This section will address both of these processes in comparison wirh therapeutic
cloning, pointing our their potential applicabili ry to the case at hand.
Abortion. T herapeuric cloning is similar to abortion in that both involve
the destruction of a prenascenr ferus. Does abortion jurisprudence affect the
potcnriallcgaliry of therapeuric cloning?
A woman's right to an abortion in the Hrst two trimesters was upheld in
the f.1mous Roe 1J. Wade ruling of 1973. As the primary basis of irs decision, the
U.S. Supreme Court held rhar "the right of personal privacy includes rhe ;tborrion decision."'; In doing so, rhe Supreme Court fra med the abortion issue in
terms of a personal decision; while perhaps one effect of Roe v. Wade was the
general attitude that life, and rights, begins at conception. the Court itself
scared:
We nerd ncn resolve the difficult qucsrion of when life hegi m. When rhose
rraincd in dtc respecrive disciplines of medicine, philosoph y. and rheology arc
unable 10 arrive at any consensus. rht: judiciary. ar rhis point in rhe devdopmcm
of man's knowledge. is not in a position

10

spccul:uc as

10

rhe an~wcr. "·

In light of such statements, the applicabiliry of aborrion jurisprudence
therapeutic cloning seems somewhat mitigated. While both involve the
destruction of embryos, abortion is protected chiefly from the perspective of
personal reproductive privacy, something to which therapeuric cloning
to

" Hoe v. U'-wde, 4 10 U.S. 113, 154 ( 1973).
at 159.

''' frl.

2006]

The Legality and Ethics ofTherapeutic Human Cloning

5

seems to have less claim. Correlative arguments for "freedom of speech" in
the case of hu man clon ing do exist'- bu r, in light of the potential criminality of the process, cannot be considered legally persuasive.
In-vitro Fatilization. Therapeutic cloning shares embryon ic destruction
with abortion but has perhaps more in common with in-vitro fertilization
(IVF), since borh p rocesses involve rhe arcificial creation of zygotes. IVF is
the fertilization of egg cells in vitro fo r evemual implantation in the womb,
while therapeutic cloning creates an embryo without ferril izarion for the purpose of scientific study.
The creation of human embryos for I VF is legal in every scare except
Louisiana,'" generally thought of as protected under the Due Process clause.
In rhe case of Griswold v. Connecticut, for instance, the Supreme Court stated
chat Due Process "provides heightened protection against government interferen ce with certain fundamental rights and liberty interests;"''' since the
Griswold case concerned contraception, it is seen as the first enumeration of
fed erally protected "reproductive rights."1" Afterwards, o ther cases, like
Washington v. Clucks berg and Lawrence ·v. Texas, reinforced such a treatment.
So IVF is protected on similar grounds co abortion: both processes,
wha tever destruction of life they entail (un-implanred JVF embryos are
frozen an d are destined, in gen eral, ro be destroyed), are legally considered
private reproductive decisions. Therapeutic cloning bears resemblance to
these processes in its general outline but not in irs purposes; we cannot protecr it fo r the same reason abortion and lVF are protected because ir cannot
be t hought of as a reproductive d ecision.

Ethics: A Note on Method
For the purposes of chis paper, I shall follow the much-celebrated preceden r of our legal sysrem: therapeutic cion i ng is to be considered ethically
innocent (permissible) until it is proven otherwise. Since any law or ethical
seance against therapeutic cloning rescricrs the liberty of individuals to
' Campbell ar 55.
" Emilie W. Clem mens, CrMting Human Embt)>Os for Re.<('tlrch: A Sciemi.ct:<Perspective on
Ma!htging the !.ega/and Ethical Issues, 2 Ind. Hcalrh L. Rev. 95, 95 (2005).
,., The Harvard I.aw Review Associarion, Note: Assessing the Vi11bi/iry ofa Substamivr Due
Proa.<s Rigbt to In Virm FmiliZtltion, I IS H arv. L. Rev. 2792, 27% (2005).
'" !d. ar 2803.
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choose for themselves, the ethical bu rden of proof clearly lies on its op ponents. Those in opposition to cloni ng should d istinguish its mo raliry from
that of sim ilar p ractices (like stem-cell research o n existenr embryos and
IVF) and present a dear reaso n for the policy decisions they support.
Suppo rters of cloning, o n the o ther hand , need on ly address the opposition's arguments effectively, allowing room for ind ividual choice. For this
reason I will principally frame my arguments negatively: though the potential beneftts of human cloning are certainly worth consideration, l will nor
treat them here as ethicaL arguments- excep t insofar as rhe ends in the case
at hand justi fy the means. To establish a dear moral precedent we should
first consider those means and the impedi ments they may p resen t; rhe potential benefi ts can then be more fully considered.

Ethical Arguments against T herapeutic Cloning
Therapeutic Cloning Destroys Embryos Destined to Become Human Beings.
Unsurprisingly, many o f the principle objections to therapeutic cloning are
similar ro the objections to stem-cell research in general: the process d estroys
h uman embryos which, shou ld they be imp lanted in utero, would eventually
become human beings. Some more conservative members of Congress have
even equated this destruction with m urder. ~ ' In fact, some see the harvesting
of cloned emb ryos for stem cells as more immoral than research on existing
embryos. "All hu man clon ing produces another human lite," said Sen. Sam
Brownback, R- Kan., a p ro-life ad vocate. "The deliberate creation and destruction of young humans through the process of [therap euric] h uman
clo n ing is morally wrong." 11 According ro Ranan Gillon, this issue involves
an "unresolved philosophical or theological problem"- namely, the term
" human life"-and is consequently hard ro discuss wirhour risk of equivocation.1J Pro-life advocates choose to "err o n the side of safery" and avoid
doing harm co anything rhat could be considered human, while ad vocates of
therapeutic cloning point our rhe great benefits to sufferers of degenerative
" Brian Hansen, Cloning debate, The CQ Researcher Online 2004,
h ttp://library.cqprcss.com/cqresearchcr/cqrcsrrc2004 102200.

" !t/.
" Ran nan Gillon, Human Reprodttaive Cloning: A l.ook tit the Argumems ag11imt It and
a Rejecrion of Mosr of'l'lmn, 92 Journal of rhc Royal Society of Medicine 3, 12
(1999).
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d iseases as well as the extremely early state of the embryos in question .
Because it is at irs core definitional (for human life), this argument wins no
converts among those who suppo rt abortion and stem-cell research on existing embryos.
Therapeutic Cloning fs Wt·ong because It 'fnstrumentalizes' Human Beings.
Och ers in opposition tO therapeutic clon ing frame their argu ments in terms
of existi ng philosophical systems. Alex Kahn asserts, "The creatio n of human
clones solely for spare cell li nes would, from a philosophical point of view,
be in obvious contradicrion to the pri nciple expressed by Emman uel Kant:
rhat of human digniry. "~4 Referencing Ka n t's eth ics is common in bioethics
because it is a system divorced from the potential benefits of an action . For
Kant, it is categorically necessary to treat human life as an end in itself-and
immoral to treat it solely as a means to other ends (research in this case).
Because therapeuric cloni ng creates hum an embryos for the sole purpose o f
performing research, it treats those embryos instrumentally and violates
Kam's ethical im perative. Here again, many see the harvesting of cloned
embryos for stem-cells as more immoral than research on existing embryos
and certainly, as we have seen, quite far from IVF, which aims to produce offsp ring. Therapeutic clon ing is a p rocess of creating to destroy-o f giving life
just to take it- o.\ hile research on existing emb ryos (which are, incidentally,
almost all discarded prod ucts of IV F) kills only embryos destined for death
anyway.
Proponents of therapeutic cloning generally respond either with a shrug
(people act instrumentally all the time, they say: look at o rgan dona tion) or
with a simple d ismissal of Kant's system in application to u ndeveloped
hum an em bryos. Here agai n dialogue f<dls, as it seems to in current legislation, along d efinitional lines: opponenrs and supporters app roach the issue
from a d ifferent definition of hu man life.
Therapeutic Cloning Is Immoral Because ft Can Lead to Other Practices.
Other opponents of therapeutic clon ing have no problem with the procedu re itself T he issue, they say, is what the legalization of therapeutic cloning
might lead to. Bioethicists like Leon Kass, a strong opponent o f reproductive clon ing and former chairman of the President's Council on Bioerhics,

., Albert Ka hn , Clone Mnmmnls .. . Clone Man, 386 Natu re 119, 119 (1997 ).
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As a marrer of policy and prudence, any opponent ofrhe manufacmre of cloned
humans !reproductive cloning) musr, I rhink, in rhe end oppose all rhe creacing
of cloned human embryos . Fro4Cn embryonic clones (belonging ro whom?) can
be shutdcd around without detection .. .. In order ro build a fence around the
law, prudence dictates that one oppose- for this reason alone- all production
of cloned human embryos, even fclr resea rch purposes. ~;

Kass's objection to therapeutic cloning is simple. Because reproductive
and therapeutic cloning are so close procedurally- the only difference is
whether the embryo is implanted or not -there is no safe way to allow therapeutic cloning witho ut the d anger that reproductive cloning will occur as
well. Jn this regard Kass is p robably right: it's hard to imagine even worldwid e illegality stopping certain scientists from raking rhis simple srep. The
legalization of therapeutic cloning would only help make such embryos
ubiquitous and easy to obtain .
Bu t is this by itself a good argument against therapeutic cloning, especially considering the benefits of irs legalization? Can we truly argue against
a practice because o f its position at the rop of a "slippery slope''? Would n't it
be immoral to rurn a blind eye to therapeutic cloning if rhe practice weren't
wrong in itself? This objection is seen as a matter of "prudence"- a "fence
around the law''- but shouldn't chat fence be made more rightly around
practices that we consider truly immoral? By itself, Kass's p rudential argument seems rather weak. If therapeutic clon ing is judged finally as an immoral practice, however, Kass's objection p rovides an additional reason w
advocate irs illegalization.
Therapt•utic Cloning is 'Oversold.' Not all scientists who oppose therapeutic cloning (and, relatedly, seem-cell research) do so solely o n moral
grounds. Some, such as Brian Hansen, simp ly do nor see the p racrice as very
sciemifi cally promising. T hese doctors and scientists accuse the scientific
commu11iry of "over-selling" the benefits of stem-cell research in order to
generate fu nd ing.
1

'

Leon Kass, The Wisdom of Repugn111u·e, lmp://www.c,nlwliccducation.o rg/aniclcs/
mcdical_ethics/ me0006.hrml.
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In reality, it is hard to say vvhether the scientific community at large has
oversold therapeutic cloning: obviously, any estimation of irs ultimate usefulness is speculative. It is important to note, though, that the vast majority
of scientists see the benefits of stem-cell research and therapeutic cloning as
extremely significant-and those in the minority usually have other objecrions, like the Christian Medical & Dental Associarion (CMDA), which opposes srem-cell research first on ethical grounds.~'·
T he debate over the research benefits of therapeutic cloning is unlike
other debates for and against cloning because it is fundamentally scientific,
nor ethical. Even proponents of cloning are worried the process will not
prove as fruitful as they've hoped,'- bur most express great hope chat it will
be very beneficial to research. T his would be, barring moral objections, a
suitable impetus to proceed. It is nor, however, enough reason to ignore the
ethi-cal objections co human cloning.
Conclusion and Recommendations
Much of the debate over therapeu tic cloning stems from a difficult definitional question: "Just what can we consider a human life, or a human
being?" T he answer to this question seems to either free us to create embryos
for research purposes or condemn the practice absolutely; no reasonable position advocates the killing of human beings to promote scientific research,
especially without their permission. The practice of creating and destroying
a human being solely for research would seem ro be even more immoral.
Advocates of therapeutic cloning do not regard embryos produced by nuclear substitution as human beings. A I 00-cell blastula, they contend, has
non e of the traits we judge as representative of a human life-certainly it is
not conscious, intelligent, or independent. Because the embryo is not a
hu man, advocates of therapeutic cloning say, it is permissible to destroy it
for the benefit of others, even without (of course) the emb ryo's consent.
This position raises several troublesome questions: When does an embryo
become a human life worthy of protecting? Where can we draw a "line in the

''' Christian Mcdie<ll /\ssociation, Doctors Condemn Human Cloning, http://www.cmda
homc.org/index.cgi?BISKrf'=1544000320&CON.IlXl'=an&an=25 58.
, . Brian Hansen, Cloning debate, The CQ Researcher Online 2004,
ht tp:/!lihrary.cqprcss.com/cqresearchcr/ cqrcsrre2004 I02200.

10

Brigham Young University Prelaw Review

[Vol. 20

sand" without at least some ambiguity? And what criteria can we use, ultimarely, to draw such a line? Without answering these questions, it seems advocates of therapeutic cloning cannot ethically proceed.
Yet we can, if we choose, maintain the ambiguity o f our "human life" definicion: we can prefer to "feel things out" case-by-case. The accommodation
of such ambiguity probably helps explain why many anti-abortionists have no
problem with IVF, even rhough IVF, like abortion, involves rhe destruction
of ferti lized embryos. Often we seem to lean on the plasticity of this definition, d irecting irs ethical force in whatever direction our more prim itive feelings guide us. Such rrearmenc seems at first like a great mistake: how can we
give defensible reasons for d rawing the lines we do when often we lean on ambiguity, even within ourselves, as to this most crucial defi nition?
Yet it is rempting to maintain this ambiguity, doubtless because it best
reflects the process of biological development. Since the developmenr of a
hu man being is in herently gradual, and no trait ap pears all at once, no single
change makes a human being out of a nonhuman, and no single line separates what we muse ethically p rotect from what we don't need to. It is my
position, indeed, that the question of this definition is ultimately unanswerable. No amount of scientific knowledge or ethical polemic will produce a
complete defi ni tion , no matter how much we'd like it to. And this is as it
should be: to seek a clean, d istinct line where ir is obvious none exists is to
belie the sloppy, tenuous situation of bioerhics; the suspension of ambiguity
here is tan tamou nt to the suspension of erhical rho ughr altogether.
Having established that any "human life" defi nition must ro some extenc
ignore the nature of biological development, I think we are left with two options. First, we can avoid drawing a line an}'\vhere except at rhe most conservative (prior ro rhe creation o f the embryo) o r most liberal p lace (birth).
Second, we can maintain the ambiguiry of our "h uman life" definition and
leave thi ngs pretry much as they are, ethically and legally. That is, we can
frame the ethicality of therapeutic cloning solely in terms of its comparative
acceptability to other practices.
The first option, on which we eliminate the am biguity of '' human life"
by. in the conservative view, considering every embryo a human being, and,
in the liberal view, by consid ering none of them htUnan beings, is nor li kely
to win many converts. It seems that if we are ro treat all embryos as human
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beings we are forced to totally eliminate abortion, IVF, and stem-cell research
along with therapeutic cloning, since each of these processes involves what
at that point cou ld be seen as nothing but manslaughter, if not genuine m urder. T he liberal view also seems unhappy, fo r the obvious reason that it
would permit practices like organ harvesting and experimentation on nearly
mature fetuses as well as earl y embryos. Bervveen the two I think the conservative view is the safer o ne ro hold, si nce it cannot possibly lead to the destruction of h uman life. Yet this view seems to rely on a kind of religious or
ph ilosophical fear, tantamount to fear of "steppi ng on God's toes in the
da rk." At its worst, th is view makes it impossible to proceed anywhere there
is ethical uncertainty. If we don't have certain knowledge of the ethicality of
a process (God-given or a priori and necessary), we are forced to recoil from
the process completely, progress be damned. Yet this is a view one can certain ly hold, without fear of violating any ethical axiom , provided one is willing to accept a strict a priori conception of ethics or feels God has given an
unambiguous answer ro the d efinitional question.
The second option, which accounts for the ambiguity of "human life"
and makes no attempt to settle this ambiguity, simply compares our reasons
for accepting or rejecting therapeutic cloning to our reasons for accepting or
rejecting other practices. It really does no more than this. The strongest ethical seance this comparison can produce is necessarily parenthesized by there
being no ultimately jiJ il/ principle fi·om which the stance receives its force.
Decidi ng the ethicality o f therapeutic cloning, on this view, becomes a simple
matter of answering two necessarily interrelated q uestions:
I . Do we have as m uch or more reason to accept therapeutic cloning as
we do abortion, IVF, and ordinary stem-cell research?
2. Do we have more reason to reject therapeutic cloning than these
other practices?
T he answer to · ! first question seems to be "yes" in the case of ordinary
stem-cell research ;II. , •obably "no" in the cases of abortion and IVF. Medical
treatment using cloned stem cells is probably even more promising than treatmen t usi ng existing lines. Therapeutically cloned stem cells, for instance, could
provide genetically identical tissue for the person cloned, lessening the chance
rhar the body rejects the transplanted tissue, where ordinary stem-cell resea rch
could prod t· ·'only foreign rissue. If the ethicality of therapeutic cloning were
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to be decided solely on the basis of its benefits, we would probably have even
more reason to accept it than stem-cell research on existing lines.
As previously stared, we do not have as much reason to accept therapeutic cloning as we do to accept abortion and IVF. Both of the latter
processes are protected for the positive reason of reproductive freedom
(whether they are protected to the same extent is n ot a q uestion I can answer here). Therapeutic clon ing has none of the claim to reproductive privacy that abortion and IYF do. It is nor an issue of reproduction or privacy
at all. No one involved in the process of therapeutic cloning is making a
choice about thei r personal lives in the same way they migln when deciding whether to ten ninate or begin a pregnancy.
The answer to the second question is, in my view, definitely "yes."
T herapeutic clon ing differs from od1er processes in that it creates and dest roys embryos deliberately and solely for the pu rposes of research. If the
d estruction of embryos in the case of abortion, IVF, and ordinary stem-cell
research were wrong, it would seem more wr·ong rhar rhe embryos in q uestion are created just ro be destroyed. T herapeutic cloning is more comprehensively questionable than these other processes because the moral.
q uestion extends to creation as well as destruction. Ignoring the benefits of
therapeutic cloning, the process compared to these others is like p icki ng up
a cat at the per store wi th the intention of puning it co sleep the same dayas opposed ro findi ng an u nwanted or dying car o n the street with the same
inten tion.
T herapeuric clon ing is decidedly more questionable, rhen, in the relative sense I have d escri bed, than the other processes l have compared it to.
In other words, there are reasons we can give to accept some or all of the
other processes l have discussed without accep ting therapemic cloning.
Inasmuch as these reasons give merit to our ethical choice, they satisfy both
the am b iguous narure of our definitions of " hum an life" and our need to
frame rhe ethics of therapeutic cloning in real-world experience, rather than
in a priori rules. T h is is rhe version of the eth ical stance against therapeutic
cloning I endorse.

